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Abstract
Following two important strands of tax compliance literature, this empirical paper develops a cross-
section analysis in order to test both the role of tax morale on tax compliance decisions and the main  
predictions of the slippery slope framework. Using data from the World Value Surveys (WWS), we find  
empirical support for the slippery slope framework, since trust in and power  of tax authorities are 
negatively and significantly related to a proxy for tax non-compliance behavior given by the size of the  
hidden economy. In particular, trust in tax authorities exerts a larger effect on shadow economy than  
the power of tax authorities. Instead, the relation between tax morale and our proxy for tax evasion is 
not statistically significant.
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1. Introduction
The concept of ‘tax morale’ and the ‘slippery slope’ framework were developed to 
address the puzzling findings in tax compliance decisions, the so-called tax compliance puzzles. 
Indeed, traditional economic models of income tax evasion à la Allingham and Sandmo (for a 
review see Sandmo, 2005), based above all on monitoring probability and expected penalty, 
predict  far too little   compliance  and far too much tax evasion (Feld and  Frey, 2002). 
Furthermore, the empirical support for the deterrent effect of audits and fines is weak and 
unstable (for a review see Kirchler et al., 2008b).
The concept of tax morale – which is usually defined as “the intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes, a moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in contributing to society by paying taxes” 
(Torgler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007) – was introduced in tax compliance literature to 
explain both the high degree of tax compliance in many countries where the level of deterrence 
is too low (Torgler, 2007; Slemrod, 2007) and the huge differences in tax compliance between 
countries or regions despite the same tax and punishment policies, the so-called ‘Palermo-
Milano puzzle’ (Rothstein, 2000). In theoretical models, tax morale is usually modeled as an 
‘internalized social norm’  for tax compliance or against tax evasion which renders evasion 
costly (Elster, 1989; Falkinger, 1995; Kolm and Larsen, 2002; Traxler, 2010; Lisi and Pugno, 
2011). However, the less people evade taxes, the more attractive it is to follow the social norm. 
Therefore, these models can account for the main shortcomings of the standard tax evasion 
model, i.e. Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model, thus supporting the empirical evidence that 
differences in the proportion of tax evasion between regions and countries may be due to 
different moral costs. Empirical studies in fact show the existence of a strong negative 
correlation between the level of tax morale and the extent of tax evasion (Torgler, 2005; Alm 
and Torgler, 2006; Alm et al., 2006; Barone and Mocetti, 2009). Furthermore, there is evidence of 
a bi-causal link between tax morale and tax evasion,
1  since tax morale affects compliance 
behavior, i.e. a higher (lower) tax morale reduces (increases) the level of tax evasion (Halla, 
2010), but, at the same time, a lower (higher) level of tax evasion also implies ceteris paribus, a 
higher (lower) tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Halla, 2010).
1 This ‘virtuous or vicious circle’ is captured by Lisi and Pugno’s (2011) model in which multiple 
equilibria emerge. In short, economies with lower tax morale can end up in equilibrium where  the 
irregular sector is larger, and economies with higher tax morale can end up in equilibrium where the 
irregular sector is smaller.
2The ‘slippery slope’ framework (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008a) distinguishes two 
forms of tax compliance: voluntary and enforced compliance. Voluntary compliance depends 
on trust in tax authorities, whereas enforced compliance depends on the power of tax 
authorities to clamp down on tax evaders.  Furthermore, the ‘slippery slope’ framework 
stresses the crucial interaction of power and trust  (Kirchler  et al., 2008a; Muehlbacher and 
Kirchler, 2010). Hence, besides the well-studied instruments of deterrence, the interaction of 
power of and trust in tax authorities is crucial in tax compliance decisions (Kirchler, 2007; 
Kirchler et al., 2008a; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). As a result, with the right mix of policy 
tools of deterrence and trust in tax authorities, it is possible to foster and stabilize the voluntary 
cooperation of honest taxpayers (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). From a theoretical point of 
view, attempts have recently been made to formalize the assumptions from the ‘slippery slope’ 
framework about the effects of trust in and power of tax authorities on tax compliance (se e.g. 
Prinz  et al., 2010; Lisi, 2011). As regards the empirical support of the ‘slippery slope’ 
framework, a laboratory experiment and an online experiment showed that trust and power 
positively influence tax payments (Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, 2010).
Among this important literature, our paper is most related to that of Torgler (2003a, b) 
and Schneider & Fischer (2009). Torgler (2003a) shows the relevance of tax rules to understand 
tax morale. In particular, he finds that vertical trust (trust in tax authorities) have a significant 
positive effect on tax morale, whereas the same tax rules can have different compliance effects. 
Instead, Schneider & Fischer (2009) find strong evidence for a positive interplay between trust 
(in) and power (of) tax authorities for tax compliance. However, both of them use tax morale 
(the dependent variable) as a proxy for tax compliance. Albeit tax morale constitutes a widely 
accepted measure of intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Schneider and Torgler, 2006), it 
underestimates actual tax compliance. For this reason, in this paper we use the size of shadow 
economy as a proxy for tax evasion, thus capturing the “overall” tax compliance. Furthermore, 
in this model, we try to integrate the two strands of tax compliance literature: the tax morale 
approach and the ‘slippery slope’ framework.
Using data from the World Value Surveys (WWS – fifth wave), as in Torgler (2003a,b) 
and Schneider & Fischer (2009), we find that tax morale and vertical trust (i.e. trust in tax 
authorities) are strong related to each other. Furthermore, we show that cultural variables such 
as horizontal trust and religious affiliation are strongly and positively related to vertical trust 
but not to tax morale. When we include these cultural controls in a regression of tax morale 
3versus vertical trust, we find that only the latter is statistically significant. This suggests that 
vertical trust is a channel through which culture can affect tax morale.
Using a methodology suggested by Algan and Cahuc (2007), we constructed  country 
level indicators of both tax morale and vertical trust for 50 countries. When these two 
indicators are regressed together with the indicator of law enforcement (our proxy of power of 
tax authorities) and other controls (pro-capita GDP, level of education, level of taxation) 
against a proxy for tax non-compliance behavior given by the size of the hidden economy, we 
find empirical support for the slippery slope framework, whereas the relation between tax 
morale and our proxy for tax evasion is not statistically significant. Vertical trust and law 
enforcement   are   negatively   and   significantly   related   to   the   level   of   hidden   economy. 
Furthermore, we find that vertical trust exerts a larger effect on shadow economy than law 
enforcement. These results are robust to different specifications of the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework and the empirical strategy used in this work; Section 3 shows the results of the 
analysis, while section 4 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework and empirical strategy 
2.1 The model
New empirical findings in tax behaviour literature point out that tax compliance is not 
only a function of purely economic factors (such as taxation, monitoring and penalty), as 
suggested by the standard tax evasion model (i.e. Allingham and Sandmo’s model), but also 
function of socio-psychological variables such as fairness and social norms or tax morale 
(Torgler, 2003a). Hence, taxpayers can comply because they fear the costs of non-compliance or 
because they feel an obligation to do so as a (good) member of a community. Expressed in 
mathematical terms, the general model of tax evasion (or tax compliance) is: 
Tax compliance = f (taxation, power of tax authorities, tax morale)
for reason of simplicity, with the concept of power of tax authorities we refer to the overall 
level of enforcement (penalty and monitoring).
In addition to this, the previous model needs to take into account the role (and the 
interaction) of power (of) and trust (in) tax authorities for “overall” tax compliance suggested 
by the ‘slippery slope’ framework.
2
2 According to Kirchler et al. (p. 212, 2008a): «By trust in authorities, we mean the general opinion of 
individuals and social groups that the tax authorities are benevolent and work beneficially for the common good».
4Precisely, Schneider & Fischer (2009) try to formalize this contribution with the 
following model (in this specification, tax morale is used as a proxy of tax compliance):
Tax morale = f (vertical trust, power of tax authorities, trust*power)
if ∂(Tax morale)/∂(trust*power) > 0 there is a positive interplay between trust (in) and power (of) 
tax authorities for tax compliance. Hence, the effects of both dimensions of tax authority on tax 
compliance re-enforce each other.
However, the ‘slippery slope’ framework distinguishes between two forms of tax 
compliance: voluntary and enforced. In accordance with the framework, increasing power of 
the authorities results in an increase of enforced tax compliance, whereas increasing trust is 
likely to result in enhanced voluntary compliance. Hence, in mathematical terms, the ‘slippery 
slope’ framework should be represented by a structural model:
Voluntary compliance = f (vertical trust, power of tax authorities)
Enforced compliance = f (vertical trust, power of tax authorities)
Furthermore, it predicts that trust increases and power decreases voluntary compliance, 
whereas power increases and trust decreases enforced compliance (Wahl, Kastlunger and 
Kirchler, 2010). Indeed, the authors call it a ‘slippery slope’ relation, alluding to its particular 
functional form.
Obviously, due to data availability, it is a difficult task to take into account the dynamic 
effects suggested by the slippery slope framework. However, albeit tax morale constitutes a 
widely accepted measure of intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Schneider and Torgler, 2006), it 
underestimates actual tax compliance (since nothing is said about enforced compliance).
3 For 
this reason, we use the size of shadow economy as a proxy for tax evasion, thus capturing the 
“overall” tax compliance. In particular, we estimate the following general model:
Overall tax compliance = f (taxation, tax morale, vertical trust, power of tax authorities)
Our empirical strategy allows us to construct an indicator of tax morale which is 
independent of the possible effect of vertical trust on the same tax morale. Therefore, this 
specification allows us to test if vertical trust works only through its relation with tax morale or 
if it has also an additional separated effect on tax evasion. 
2.2 Main variables
3 Indeed, as acknowledged by Schneider and Fisher themselves (p. 11, 2009) « Using information on 
the attitude tax morale in place of a direct measure of tax evasion may well overestimate true tax honesty, so that  
any effects we detect in an empirical tax morale context are probably smaller for actual tax compliance ».
5Following  Halla  (2010)  our  approximated  measure of  tax evasion  (i.e.  tax  non-
compliance behavior) is given by the size of the shadow economy (measured as percentage of 
official GDP). The source of this last indicator is Schneider et al. (2010). According to Schneider 
et al. (2010, p. 5), « […] the shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and  
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for any of the following reasons: (1) to 
avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; (2) to avoid payment of social security  
contributions; (3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum  
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and  (4) to avoid complying with certain 
administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms 
».
In order to measure tax morale and vertical trust we used the responses to ‘WVS – fifth 
wave’  questions.
4  In particular our measure of  tax morale  is based on the answer to the 
following question: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always 
be justified, never be justified, or something in between: cheating on taxes if you have a chance. 
Respondents are asked to evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from “never justifiable” (1) to 
“always justifiable” (10). Note that an increase in this scale implies a decrease in tax morale.
Our measure of vertical trust is approximated by the confidence in government and is 
based on the answer to the following question: I am going to name a number of organizations. For 
each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: Government. Is it a great deal of 
confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4) ? . Also in 
this case an increase in this scale leads to a decrease in the level of trust in tax authorities.
As regards our proxy of power of tax authorities, i.e. law enforcement, we used an 
indicator proposed by  Kaufmann  et al. (2010), which measures the perceived  quality of 
contract enforcement, protection of property rights, police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. This indicator assumes values between –2.5 and 2.5, where an 
increase in the indicator means a better enforcement.
4 WVS was conducted in 2004-2008. In particular the countries and the year in which the survey 
was carried out are: Andorra (2005), Argentina (2006), Australia (2005), Burkina Faso (2007), Bulgaria 
(2006), Brazil (2006), Canada (2006), Switzerland (2007), Chile (2005), China (2007), Colombia (2005), 
Cyprus (2006), Germany (2006), Egypt (2008), Spain (2007), Ethiopia (2007), Finland (2005) France (2006), 
United Kingdom (2006), Georgia (2008), Ghana (2007), Guatemala (2005), Honk Kong (2005), Indonesia 
(2006), India (2006), Iran (2007), Iraq (2006), Italy (2005), Jordan (2007), Japan (2005), South Korea (2005), 
Morocco (2007), Moldova, Rep. of (2006), Mexico( 2005), Mali (2007), Malaysia (2006), Netherlands 
(2006), Norway (2008), New Zealand (2004), Peru (2008), Poland (2005), Romania (2005), Rwanda (2007), 
Serbia (2006), Slovenia (2005), Sweden (2006), Thailand (2007), Trinidad and Tobago (2007),  Taiwan 
(2006), Ukraine (2006), Uruguay (2006), USA (2006), Vietnam (2006), South Africa (2007), Zambia (2007).
6In table 1 we report data on the main variables of the model, while in figures 1-2-3 we 
plotted our measure of  tax non-compliance behavior  against the indicator of tax morale, 
vertical trust and law enforcement, respectively.
5  In all cases, the correlations are strong, 
statistically significant and of expected sign.
6
==========  Table 1 and Figures 1-2-3 about here (now at the end)  =========
2.3  Empirical strategy
One way to analyze the relation between tax evasion, tax morale and vertical trust is to 
regress our measure of tax evasion against two aggregate indicators of tax morale and vertical 
trust given for each country by the simple average of the values obtained from the answers to 
the   two   associated   WVS   questions.   However,   this   simple   approach   has   an   important 
limitation. In particular, cross-countries difference between this type of indicators may not 
reflect the role of specific national features but only the composition of the population (for 
instance the level of education or the age structure of the population). We could correct for this 
by introducing such composition variables directly into the regression for aggregate outcomes, 
but this would consume too many degrees of freedom.
To avoid this problem we follow an empirical strategy proposed by Algan and Cahuc 
(2007). In particular, in order to estimate an indicator of a country’s tax morale, we run an 
ordered probit regression for the associated question on a set of controls which allows to 
account for population composition effects and other possible confounding factors in the 
construction of the indicator. These controls are the level of education, the marital status, the 
number of children, the family income, the employment status, the perceived health status of 
the respondent, a measure of risk aversion and the respondent’s religious affiliation. It follows 
that  the  fixed effect obtained  for each country,  i.e. the  “country dummy variable”,  is 
interpreted as the indicator of the country’s tax morale. In tax morale literature it is often 
argued that a determinant of tax morale is the vertical trust (see for instance Torgler, 2003a; 
Torgler 2003b; Frey and Torgler, 2007). For this reason we also include vertical trust as a 
control. Furthermore, in order to distinguish between vertical trust and horizontal trust (i.e. 
trust among people), we also included an indicator of horizontal trust obtained through the 
following question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you 
5 In figures 1-2-3, all four indicators have been normalized to be in the interval [0, 1]. In particular, 
the indicators of tax morale and vertical trust have been normalized by dividing them by their respective 
sample maximum. The normalized indicator of rule of law has been obtained by adding the sample 
minimum to all of the observations and dividing by the sample maximum of this transformed indicator.
6 Recall that the ordering of our variable that measures tax morale implies that an increase in this 
indicator leads to a decrease in tax morale.
7need to be very careful in dealing with people (2) ? , and then we created a dummy variable equal 
to one if the answer is 1 – i.e. most people can be trusted – and 0 otherwise. However, legal 
institutions may also affect both tax morale and the level of vertical trust. As observed by 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002, p. 210): « [...] in a community where criminal behavior is effectively 
persecuted, individuals will trust more because they will feel more protected against extreme non 
cooperative behavior ». For this reason, we also include our proxy of law enforcement among the 
controls. Furthermore we believe that the inclusion of this indicator will yield an indicator of 
tax morale which is net of the possible reverse effect of the widespread of illegal activity on tax 
morale. 
A similar methodology is applied in order to obtain an aggregate indicator for the trust 
in tax authorities (specifically, the confidence in government). Even in this case we include the 
control for horizontal trust and the indicator of rule of law.
In table 2 we report the fixed effects associated with tax morale and vertical trust for 
each county.
==========  Table 2 about here (now at the end)  =========
Finally, the indicators of tax morale and trust in tax authorities obtained with the 
methodology described above are used as regressors in an OLS estimate – together with other 
control variables such as pro-capita GDP, level of education, level of taxation  – where the 
dependent variable is the shadow economy measured as percentage of official GDP.  
3. Results of the analysis
3.1 Determinants of Tax Morale and Vertical trust
Table 3 reports the results about the determinants of tax morale and vertical trust (see 
the Appendix for details about the control variables).
==========  Appendix and Table 3 about here (now at the end)  =========
Both age and being female imply a higher tax morale and vertical trust (however for the 
latter the second result is not statistically significant).
7 As regards tax morale, these results are 
in line with previous findings by other authors (see for instance Halla, 2010); while, as regards 
vertical trust, Guiso et al. (2003) find the same positive relation between the process of ageing 
and confidence in government, but a positive effect determined by being male. We recall that 
our dependent variables – tax morale and vertical trust – are ordered in such a way that a 
7  In this section to simplify the exposition, we refer to the impacts of a variable on tax morale (or on 
vertical trust), but these should be interpreted as correlations. 
8coefficient’s positive sign is to be interpreted as a negative effect on the dependent variable. 
The reverse is true if the sign is negative.
The relation between tax morale and vertical trust goes in the expected direction. In 
particular, a decrease in the level of vertical trust leads to a decrease in the level of tax morale 
and this relation is statistically very significant. Note that once we control for vertical trust, 
horizontal trust and belonging to a religious denomination are not statistically significant 
determinants of tax morale. At the same time, horizontal trust and belonging to a religious 
denomination (this is true for all of the denominations considered) have a positive effect on 
vertical trust. Also in this case, the positive relation between religiosity and vertical trust are in 
line with Guiso et al. (2003)‘s findings. This suggests that vertical trust is a channel through 
which national culture can affect tax morale.
Risk aversion is positively correlated with tax morale and this result is strongly 
statistically significant, whereas the relation between risk aversion and vertical trust is not. 
A higher income makes tax evasion more justifiable,
8 but at the same leads to higher 
vertical trust. However in this latter case the evidence is weak.
The  direction  of   the  relation  between  education   and  tax  morale   is  theoretically 
ambiguous. As observed by Torgler (2003b),  better educated taxpayers are aware of the 
benefits and services provided to them by the state, but for this reason they might be more 
critical on how the state uses tax revenues. In particular, we find that  education exerts a 
positive effect on tax morale but a negative effect on vertical trust. Hence, these results confirm 
the idea that education positively influences the awareness of the benefit of tax compliance but 
at the same time makes people more critical about the actions of the state (as observed by 
Guiso  et al., 2003). It is worthwhile noting that Guiso  et al. (2003) find that even if more 
educated people have less confidence in the government, they tend to trust other people more. 
Since horizontal and vertical trust are strongly and positively correlated, these findings suggest 
that there is a role for education as an instrument to foster vertical trust through the positive 
effect on horizontal trust.
Finally, better law enforcement leads to both an increase in tax morale and in vertical 
trust.
9
3.2 Determinants of Tax Evasion
8 In fact, high-income households have more opportunities to evade taxes compared to low-income 
households (Halla and Schneider, 2008).
9 In fact, a strong rule of law were shown to increase tax morale (Torgler, Schaffner and Macintyre, 
2007).
9Table 4 shows the results of OLS regression (with or without controls) in which the 
dependent variable is the size of the shadow economy (measured as percentage of official 
GDP) and the main independent variables are tax morale, vertical trust and rule of law (see 
table 5 for a description of all the independent variables).
==========  Tables 4 and 5 about here (now at the end)  =========
To facilitate the interpretation of the reported coefficient, we normalized the indicators 
obtained from the two ordered probit reported in table 3 to be in the interval [0, 100].  We did 
this in two steps. We first obtained an indicator defined in the interval [0, 1], applying the same 
methodology applied to the rule of law indicator. Afterwards, these two normalized indicators 
were multiplied by 100. Note that the higher the value assumed by one of these indicators, the 
lower the tax morale/confidence.
In all cases, vertical trust and rule of law are statistically significant and the relation 
goes in the expected direction. A decrease in vertical trust leads to an increase in shadow 
economy, while the opposite is true for an increase in law enforcement. However, the relation 
between tax morale and our proxy for tax evasion is not statistically significant. Furthermore, 
we find that  vertical trust  exerts a larger impact than rule of law
  10  : in particular, a unit 
increase in  vertical trust  indicator (hence an increase in the level of distrust) leads to an 
increase of 0.27% in the size of the hidden economy, while a unit increase in the rule of law 
indicator (hence a better law enforcement) leads to a decrease in the size of the hidden 
economy of 0.20%. Among the other control variables, only GDP per capita is significant.
Table 4 also shows the IV estimate (see column c) in which we instrumented vertical 
trust using a variable obtained from the following WVS question: Do you think most people 
would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Respondents are 
asked to evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from “people would try to take advantage of 
you” (1) to “people would try to be fair” (10). Following Kawachi et al. (1997), we interpret this 
variable as a dimension (the perceived lack of fairness in a society) of horizontal trust. We 
named this variable advantage. We believe that the existence of a relation between vertical 
trust (instrumented variable) and our instrument is unquestionable. The main issue is whether 
the belief regarding the opportunistic behavior of others can have a direct effect on tax evasion 
or whether its effect is only due to its relation with the instrumented variable.  In the former 
case, our instrument is not valid. In general the less likely people are to pay taxes, the stronger 
the individual incentives to evade. However the chances to adopt opportunistic behavior are 
10 In fact, voluntary tax compliance plays a much more decisive role for tax honesty compared to 
that of enforced tax compliance (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992; Feld and Frey, 2002).
10determined by institutional settings and in particular by the quality of the legal institutions. 
Since we are controlling for the quality of legal institutions (through the indicator of rule of 
law) we believe that the residual possible effect on tax evasion of the belief about other 
people’s opportunistic behavior will be uniquely determined by the trust in the ability of the 
institutions to prevent and repress these behaviors.
We report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. The null hypothesis is that 
there are no endogenous variables or that endogeneity does not affect the OLS estimator. The 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, note that this test is not valid if the instrument is 
not valid and in a just-identified model we are not able to perform a test for the validity of the 
instrument.
As  regards  the  relevance  of our instrument,  the  Anderson   canonical  correlation 
likelihood-ratio test shows that the model is well identified and the instrument is relevant. 
Furthermore, it also seems that weak identification cannot be claimed (see the Stock-Yogo test).
3.3 Robustness
In this section we check the robustness of our findings introducing both alternative 
measures of vertical trust (trust in tax authorities) and a variable that captures another 
dimension of morality (i.e. how much people justify corruption).
The alternative measures of vertical trust are based on the following WVS questions: I 
am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you 
have in them: Police:  Is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much  
confidence (3) or none at all (4) ? Justice system: Is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of 
confidence (2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4) ? Parliament: Is it a great deal of 
confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4) ? We named 
these alternative measures of vertical trust police, justice and parliament, respectively.
The indicator concerning the acceptability of corruption is based on the following 
question:  Please tell me for each  of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: someone accepting a bribe. Respondents are 
asked to evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from “never justifiable” (1) to “always 
justifiable” (10). We named this variable bribe.
Country level indicators for bribe, police, justice and parliament are obtained with the 
same methodology applied to tax morale and confidence and discussed in section 2.2. Table 6 
shows the results of the ordered probit regression where the dependent variables are bribe, 
police, justice and parliament, respectively, and the set of regressors is the same as in table 3.
11==========  Table 6 about here (now at the end)  =========
As regards the alternative measures of vertical trust (trust in tax authorities), the results 
are very similar to those obtained for the confidence in government; while, as regards the 
acceptability of corruption it is worthwhile to note that it is not correlated with horizontal and 
vertical trust. An increase in education is associated with an increase in the level of morality. 
Risk aversion is negatively correlated with the degree of acceptability of corruption. Also, in 
this case, better law enforcement leads to a higher morality.
Furthermore, we also extracted the first principal component of police, justice, parliament 
and confidence in government in order to obtain a variable that synthesizes the four measures of 
confidence in institutions. We named this variable institution. Table 7 reports the results of a 
regression of hidden economy against bribe, rule, tax morale, confidence (column a), police 
(column b), parliament (column c), justice (column d), institutions (column e), plus controls for 
GDP per capita, level of education and tax burden. All the indicators have been normalized to 
be in the interval [0, 100] where 100 indicates the lowest level of confidence/public morality 
(see table 8 for a description of these new variables).
11
==========  Table 7 about here (now at the end)  =========
In all cases,  vertical trust (trust in tax authorities)  is statistically significant and the 
relation goes in the expected direction. Furthermore, the indicator regarding acceptability of 
corruption is statistically significant and its relation goes in the expected direction, i.e. an 
increase in the acceptability of corruption leads to an increase in the size of the hidden 
economy. Finally, the acceptability of corruption, taken together with each indicator of vertical 
trust (trust in tax authorities), always exerts a larger effect than law enforcement.
12
4. Conclusions
Following two important strands of tax compliance literature, this empirical paper 
develops a cross-section analysis in order to test both the role of tax morale on tax compliance 
decisions and the main predictions of the slippery slope framework.
Using data from the World Value Surveys (WWS – fifth wave), we show that cultural 
variables such as horizontal trust and religious affiliation are strongly and positively related to 
vertical trust but not to tax morale. When we include these cultural controls in a regression of 
tax morale versus vertical trust, only the latter is statistically significant. This suggests that 
11  The  indicators have  been normalized  using  the   same  methodology applied to the  law 
enforcement indicator. 
12 Note also that in column b the indicator of law enforcement (rule2) is not significant. Probably, 
the confidence in police and rule2 capture similar aspect of law enforcement. 
12vertical trust is a channel through which national culture can affect tax morale. We also find 
that an increase in the acceptability of corruption leads to an increase in the size of the hidden 
economy.
Furthermore, we find empirical support for the slippery slope framework, since both 
trust in tax authorities and law enforcement (namely, our proxy of power of tax authorities) are 
negatively and significantly related to the level of hidden economy. In particular, we find that 
trust in tax authorities exerts a larger effect on shadow economy than law enforcement. These 
results are robust to different specifications of the model.
A very important policy implication is that Governments should avoid establishing a 
cops and robbers climate with tax-payers. Instead, tax authorities should try to gain the citizens’ 
trust. As suggested by Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler (2010), punishing unintentional filling 
errors with severe sanctions is a less effective strategy than offering services to correct fill out 
tax forms. At the same time, being too soft with habitual tax dodgers (e.g. frequently granting 
tax   amnesties)   may   generate   distrust   in   honest   taxpayers   and   hence   lower   voluntary 
compliance. 
13APPENDIX
Definition of control variables
Religion: we created a dummy variable termed ‘atheist’ if an individual did not belong to a 
religious denomination and a dummy for each of the other “dominant” religions: Roman 
Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, no denominational religion 
(if an individual declares to being a religious person but to belong to a  religion with no 
denomination), and other religion (which includes all religions differing from those listed).
13 
The relative questions in WVS are the following: a) Do you belong to a religious denomination? In 
case you do, answer which one; b) Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would 
you say you are (read out and code one answer):  (1) A religious person (2) Not a religious person (3) A 
convinced atheist. We split those declaring to not belonging to a religious denomination into two 
categories: atheist and belonging to a non denominational religion. In particular we define as 
atheist a person who has declared to being both a convinced atheist and to not belong to a 
religious denomination, while a person who has declared to being a religious person but to not 
belong to a religious denomination enters into the category  no denominational religion.  Our 
reference category is atheist. 
Education:  We created dummy variables for each of the possible levels reported on the 
following WVS question: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if 
respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]:  (1) No formal 
education. (2) Incomplete primary school, (3) Complete primary school, (4) Incomplete secondary 
school:   technical/vocational   type,   (5)   Complete   secondary   school:   technical/vocational   type,   (6)  
Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type, (7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory  
type,   (8)   Some   university-level   education,   without   degree,   (9)   University-level   education.  The 
reference  category is  no  formal  education.    The  associated dummy variables  are named 
respectively:  noeduc,   incprimary,   primary,       inctechnical,   technical   incsecondary,   secondary, 
someuniv, university. The reference category is noeduc.
Age :  respondent’s age in our analysis.  Female: a dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent’s sex was female. 
13 By the term ‘dominant religions’ we intend religions with the highest numbers of followers.
14Income:  we built ten indicators of its level on the basis of the answers to the following 
question: Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting  
all wages, salaries, pensions, and other income that comes in. Just give the letter of the group your  
household falls into, before taxes and other deductions (income categories are coded by decile for 
each society, 1=lowest decile, 10=highest decile). These indicators are named respectively 
firststep, secondstep, thirdstep, fourthstep, fivethstep, sixthstep, seventhstep, eighthstep, ninethstep,  
tenthstep. The reference category is firststep.
Risk aversion: This variable is obtained through  the answers to the following question: Now I 
will briefly describe some people: Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an  
exciting life. Would you please indicate whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat  
like you, not like you, or not at all like you ?.  We created a variable that goes from 1 if the 
individual declares “very much like you” to 6 if the individual declares “not at all like you”. 
Hence an increase in this variable indicates more risk aversion. To our knowledge we are the 
first to include a control for risk aversion among the determinants of tax morale.
Rule of law:  the normalized version of the indicator of law enforcement (named  rule) 
proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010).
1516Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Country\variable Hidden 
a Vertical trust 
b Tax Morale 
c Rule of Law 
d
ARG 25.300 0.217 1.702 -0.566
AUS 14.000 0.137 2.032 1.672
BFA 40.500 0.170 2.523 -0.412
BGR 35.300 0.257 2.398 -0.126
BRA 39.000 0.215 3.646 -0.415
CAN 15.700 0.129 1.813 1.753
CHE 8.500 0.039 2.082 1.816
CHL 19.300 0.172 1.955 1.249
CHN 12.700 0.010 1.953 -0.450
COL 37.300 0.198 1.563 -0.730
CYP 28.000 0.168 1.948 1.030
DEU 16.000 0.243 2.139 1.688
EGY 34.900 . 1.723 -0.052
ESP 22.500 0.132 2.063 1.083
ETH 38.600 0.231 1.461 -0.571
FIN 17.700 0.043 2.142 1.888
FRA 15.000 0.310 2.824 1.411
GBR 12.500 0.202 2.291 1.703
GEO 65.800 0.215 1.685 -0.232
GHA 40.700 0.062 1.000 0.040
GTM 50.500 0.222 2.508 -1.119
HON 16.000 0.035 1.948 1.558
IDN 18.900 0.061 1.573 -0.707
IND 22.200 0.117 3.029 0.192
IRN 18.300 0.056 2.028 -0.894
ITA 27.000 0.201 2.176 0.490
JOR 18.500 0.042 1.758 0.520
JPN 11.000 0.176 1.456 1.243
KOR 26.800 0.084 1.664 0.963
MAR 34.900 0.124 1.779 -0.139
MDA 44.500 0.264 3.550 -0.537
MEX 30.000 0.200 2.625 -0.400
MLI 40.700 0.078 3.319 -0.358
MYS 30.900 0.033 3.533 0.564
NLD 13.200 0.209 2.263 1.733
NOR 18.700 0.055 2.282 1.942
NZL 12.400 0.104 2.155 1.811
PER 58.000 0.359 . -0.756
POL 27.200 0.250 2.455 0.470
ROM 32.600 0.272 2.343 -0.115
RUS 43.800 0.176 3.045 -0.933
RWA 40.100 . 2.248 -0.588
SVN 26.200 0.183 2.370 0.872
SWE 18.800 0.108 2.294 1.817
THA 50.600 0.079 2.756 -0.019
TTO 33.400 0.212 2.214 -0.268
TUR 31.300 0.152 1.339 0.031
TWN 25.000 0.216 1.900 0.781
UKR 49.700 0.226 3.279 -0.812
URY 50.600 0.164 1.982 0.484
USA 8.600 0.117 1.955 1.573
VNM 15.100 . 1.659 -0.402
ZAF 27.300 0.085 2.522 0.149
ZMB 47.100 0.178 3.664 -0.536
17a size of the hidden economy as percentage of official GDP. Average 1999-2007.Source: Schneider et al. (‘10)
b percentage of people declaring “not at all” confidence in government. Source: WVS (fifth wave)
c country mean. A higher value indicates lower tax morale. Source: WVS(fifth wave)


































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Distrust in Government
The two indicators have been normalized dividing them by their maximum
(corr.=0.39;sig.=0.0048)
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Tax Morale
The two indicators have been normalized dividing them by their maximum
(corr.=0.30;sig.=0.027)
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Rule of Law
Rule of Law has been normalized by adding its minimum and then dividing by its maximum
(corr.= -0.69 ;sig.=0.000)
Hidden vs. Rule of Law
Figure 3
2021Table 2. Country fixed effects
Tax Morale Vertical trust
ARG -1.032***(0.063) SWE -0.103***(0.020)  ARG -0.104***(0.033)  SVN 0.282***(0.019)   
AND -0.273***(0.029)  THA -0.023 (0.068)      AND 0.147***(0.023)    SWE 0.158***(0.031)   
AUS -0.256***(0.012)  TTO -0.499***(0.048)  AUS 0.166***(0.011)    THA -0.173***(0.056) 
BFA -0.380***(0.077)  TUR -0.974***(0.010)  BFA -0.250***(0.042)  TTO 0.026(0.023)      
BGR -0.217***(0.020)  TWN -0.348***(0.033)  BGR 0.033***(0.011)    TUR -0.596***(0.046) 
BRA 0.184***(0.051) URY -0.503***(0.033)  BRA -0.268***(0.038)  TWN 0.135***(0.023)   
CAN -0.362***(0.016)  USA -0.277***(0.018)  CAN 0.217***(0.018)    URY -0.517***(0.038) 
CHE -0.131***(0.015)  VNM -0.823***(0.052)  CHE -0.264***(0.014)  USA 0.140***(0.017)   
CHL -0.440***(0.026)  ZAF -0.244***(0.042)  CHL -0.024  (0.031)     VNM -2.566***(0.058) 
CHN -0.443***(0.050)  FRA 0.104***(0.025)    CHN -1.540***(0.051)  ZAF -0.946***(0.046) 
CYP -0.285***(0.042)  GBR -0.168***(0.018)  CYP -0.210***(0.019)  FRA 0.480***(0.032)   
DEU -0.132***(0.025)  NLD -0.198***(0.019)  DEU 0.526***(0.030)    GBR 0.295***(0.015)   
ESP -0.376***(0.033)  RUS -0.132***(0.016)  ESP 0.016 (0.032)      NLD 0.461***(0.029)   
ETH -1.089***(0.031)  IRN -0.697***(0.061)  ETH 0.012 (0.022)      RUS -0.390***(0.009) 
FIN -0.106***(0.019)  ZMB 0.107* (0.056)     FIN -0.264***(0.037)  IRN -0.770***(0.040) 
GHA -7.992***(0.144)  GHA -0.960***(0.041)  ZMB -0.417***(0.032) 
GEO -0.771***(0.038)  GEO -0.0241 (0.016) 
IDN -1.052***(0.104)  IDN -0.514***(0.041) 
IND -0.125***(0.043)  IND -0.573***(0.044) 
JOR -0.718***(0.098)  JOR -1.415***(0.052) 
JPN -0.840***(0.032)  JPN 0.242***(0.025)   
KOR -0.705***(0.032)  KOR -0.0868***(0.021) 
MAR -0.822***(0.103)  MAR -0.373***(0.050) 
MDA 0.137***(0.027)  MDA -0.013  (0.017)    
MEX -0.338***(0.054)  MEX -0.263***(0.029) 
MLI -0.057  (0.104)  MLI -0.869***(0.050) 
MYS 0.369***(0.067)  MYS -0.938***(0.030) 
POL -0.239***(0.038)  PER 0.328***(0.027)   
ROM -0.412***(0.031)  POL 0.438***(0.026)   
SRB 0.481***(0.025)  ROM 0.256***(0.019)   
SVN -0.197***(0.026)  SRB 0.096***(0.012)   
Cluster Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01






age              -0.005*** (0.000) -0.002** (0.000)
female            -0.083*** (0.020) -0.021 (0.014)
horiztrust               0.027 (0.023) -0.222*** (0.020)
verticaltrust        0.073*** (0.013) .
nodenomrel          0.029 (0.063) -0.078* (0.047)
otherrel         -0.003 (0.042) -0.099*** (0.038)
catholic         -0.003 (0.055) -0.193*** (0.039)
muslim              -0.103 (0.095) -0.311*** (0.064)
protestant         -0.070 (0.052) -0.157*** (0.051)
orthodox          0.020 (0.086) -0.159*** (0.044)
buddhist            0.031 (0.058) -0.134** (0.067)
riskaversion         -0.069*** (0.008) 0.010 (0.007)
incprimary        -0.079** (0.038) 0.000 (0.043)
primary           -0.051 (0.036) 0.037 (0.043)
technical         -0.118*** (0.036) 0.129*** (0.050)
inctechnical       -0.071* (0.039) 0.118*** (0.045)
incsecondary      -0.114*** (0.037) 0.086* (0.048)
secondary         -0.142*** (0.038) 0.132** (0.053)
someuniv           -0.094** (0.041) 0.131** (0.055)
university        -0.184*** (0.038) 0.161** (0.065)
secondstep         0.003 (0.036) -0.002 (0.032)
thirdstep       -0.008 (0.031) 0.011 (0.027)
fourthstep          0.065** (0.029) 0.016 (0.025)
fifthstep          0.039 (0.030) -0.019 (0.019)
sixthstep        0.085** (0.038) -0.037 (0.028)
seventhstep       0.096*** (0.033) -0.031 (0.034)
eighthtstep            0.101*** (0.038) 0.008 (0.039)
ninethstep        0.153*** (0.051) -0.080** (0.039)
tenthstep         0.122* (0.066) -0.023 (0.055)
rule                -0.413*** (0.079) -0.651*** (0.040)
N 61314 63981
pseudo R-square          0.049 0.096   
Controlling for marital status, employment status, health status and number of 
children.
Marital status controls has been inserted by creating an indicator for each of the 
following statuses: single, cohabiting, married, separated, divorced and widowed. 
We also included indicators for each employment status on the basis of the question: 
“Are you employed now or not? If yes: About how many hours a week? If more than 
one job: only for the main job” (1 = full time; 2 = part time; 3 = self employed; 4 = retired; 
5 = housewife; 6 = student; 7 = unemployed; 8 = other). We created an indicator equal to 
one for each state of health. These variables were respectively named, phealth, fhealth, 
ghealth, vghealth.
Country fixed effect for column (a) and (b) are  respectively reported in  Table 2
Cluster Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0125Table 4. Tax Evasion against Tax Morale, Vertical trust, Law enforcement
(a) OLS (b) OLS (c) IV
rule2 -0.377***(0.063) -0.205**(0.100) -0.199**(0.093)
verticaltrust 0.206***(0.076) 0.273***(0.084) 0.312**(0.134)





_cons 42.43***(10.130) 73.22***(16.970) 73.68***(15.510)
N 46 40 40
adjusted R-square 0.447 0.493   0.490
Tests of endogeneity of: confidence
H0:Regressor isexogenous
 Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.12510  Chi-sq(1)
P-value = 0.724
Underidentification test




Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 
10% maximal IV size
15% maximal IV size
20% maximal IV size
25% maximal IV size  
          16.222




Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
26Table 5. Variables: definitions and sources
Rule2 Indicator of law enforcement. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the 




Indicator of confidence in tax authorities (approximated with confidence in 
government). It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of 
confidence, while 100 the lowest. Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
taxmorale Indicator of tax morale. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of 
tax morale, while 100 the lowest. Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
lgdp
Log of GDP pro capita at constant price and in PPP (base year 2003). For each 
country we take the year correspondent to WVS year.  Our elaboration on IMF 
data: W. E.O. Database 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx
education Average year of schooling. Year: 2005. Source: Barro and Lee (2010)
tottax Total tax rate is the total amount of taxes payable by businesses (except for labor taxes) 
after accounting for deductions and exemptions as a percentage of profit.  For each 
country we take the year correspondent to WVS year.  
Source World Bank, Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). 










age -0.006***(0.001) -0.002**(0.001) -0.001*(0.001) 0.001(0.001)
female -0.055***(0.014) -0.043***(0.013) 0.014(0.015) -0.036***(0.012)
horiztrust 0.007(0.024) -0.189***(0.020) -0.196***(0.024) -0.212***(0.023)
verticaltrust 0.020(0.013) . . .
nodenomrel 0.049(0.044) -0.145***(0.041) -0.0670(0.055) -0.101**(0.040)
otherrel 0.074**(0.031) -0.153***(0.026) -0.055(0.042) -0.098***(0.028)
catholic 0.062(0.045) -0.240***(0.031) -0.175***(0.044) -0.175***(0.029)
muslim 0.033(0.099) -0.299***(0.064) -0.248***(0.066) -0.271***(0.070)
protestant -0.002(0.047) -0.233***(0.039) -0.134***(0.050) -0.157***(0.034)
orthodox 0.043(0.077) -0.132**(0.059) -0.141***(0.051) -0.112**(0.053)
buddhist 0.111*(0.057) -0.173***(0.052) -0.082(0.076) -0.070(0.068)
riskaversion -0.081***(0.009) 0.001(0.007) 0.023***(0.007) 0.006(0.008)
incprimary -0.038(0.042) 0.073*(0.041) 0.005(0.045) 0.015(0.044)
primary -0.061(0.042) 0.120***(0.040) 0.033(0.044) 0.106**(0.046)
technical -0.143***(0.047) 0.208***(0.045) 0.010**(0.047) 0.171***(0.053)
inctechnical -0.066(0.040) 0.193***(0.038) 0.090**(0.039) 0.170***(0.045)
incsecondary -0.164***(0.054) 0.147***(0.044) 0.044(0.065) 0.132**(0.051)
secondary -0.212***(0.055) 0.228***(0.044) 0.081*(0.047) 0.177***(0.052)
someuniv -0.186***(0.058) 0.257***(0.052) 0.073(0.057) 0.166***(0.055)
university -0.290***(0.055) 0.284***(0.053) 0.094(0.066) 0.197***(0.067)
secondstep -0.032(0.034) -0.015(0.024) 0.013(0.027) 0.009(0.032)
thirdstep -0.048(0.034) -0.004(0.021) 0.001(0.0223) 0.030(0.026)
fourthstep 0.006(0.029) 0.003(0.020) -0.007(0.023) 0.021(0.027)
fifthstep -0.006(0.028) -0.021(0.021) -0.036*(0.019) 0.004(0.024)
sixthstep 0.048(0.039) -0.068***(0.026) -0.065**(0.029) -0.060**(0.029)
seventhstep 0.061(0.038) -0.043(0.029) -0.036(0.032) -0.043*(0.025)
eighthstep 0.063*(0.037) -0.059*(0.033) -0.025(0.0354) -0.025(0.036)
ninethstep 0.115**(0.050) -0.092**(0.045) -0.090**(0.041) -0.030(0.041)
tenthstep 0.083(0.090) 0.005(0.047) -0.039(0.054) -0.047(0.051)
rule -0.989***(0.083) -1.367***(0.061) -1.181***(0.049) -1.405***(0.056)
N 61487 66191 63402 65360
pseudo R-sq 0.055 0.084 0.112 0.088
Controlling for marital status, employment status, health perceived status and country fixed effects.
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01Table 7: Robustness check
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
bribe
0.173**(0.071)
0.127*(0.075) 0.200***(0.064) 0.199***(0.072) 0.170**(0.069)
taxmorale -0.004(0.105) 0.061(0.103) 0.000(0.098) 0.007(0.108) 0.014(0.102)
rule2 -0.252**(0.096) -0.102(0.113) -0.198**(0.093) -0.210*(0.107) -0.178*(0.100)
verticaltrust 0.212**(0.083) . . . .
police . 0.234***(0.079) . . .
parliament . . 0.276***(0.081) . .
justice . . . 0.161*(0.081) .
institutions . 0.235***(0.080)
lgdp -5.148*(3.029) -5.842*(2.987) -5.652*(2.852) -4.672(3.123) -5.511*(2.964)
education 0.751(1.026)    0.745(0.991) 0.694(0.952) 0.870(1.069) 0.643(1.002)
tottax -0.058(0.084)       -0.080(0.083) -0.038(0.079) -0.061(0.088) -0.060(0.082)
_cons 61.880***(16.510
)   
59.150***(15.950) 56.570***(15.350) 58.950***(17.010) 59.850***(15.980)
N 40 40 40 40 40
adjusted R-
square
0.558 0.581 0.610 0.526 0.581
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
29Table 8: Definition of the new variables contained on table 7
Police Indicator of confidence in tax authorities (approximated with confidence in 
police). It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of 
confidence, while 100 the lowest. Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
Justice Indicator of confidence in tax authorities (approximated with confidence in 
justice). It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of 
confidence, while 100 the lowest. Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
Parliament Indicator   of   confidence   in   tax   authorities   (approximated   with   confidence   in 
parliament). It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of confidence, 
while 100 the lowest. Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
Institutions Indicator of confidence in tax authorities (obtained taking the first principal 
component of the four indicators police, justice, parliament and confidence). It ranges 
from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of tax morale, while 100 the lowest. 
Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
Bribe  Indicator of public morality (approximated with the acceptability of corruption). It 
ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the highest level of morality, while 100 the 
lowest. Source: Our elaborations on WVS data
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